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Abstract
This paper examines the role of social and cultural norms regarding fertility
in women’s HIV risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility, or the ability to bear chil-
dren, is highly valued in most African societies, and premarital fertility is often
encouraged in order to facilitate marriage. This, however, increases women’s
exposure to HIV risk by increasing unprotected premarital sexual activity. I
construct a lifecycle model that relates a woman’s decisions concerning sex,
fertility and education to HIV risk. The model is calibrated to match Kenyan
women’s data on fertility, marriage and HIV prevalence. Quantitative results
show that fertility motives play a substantial role in women’s, especially young
women’s, HIV risk. If premarital births did not facilitate marriage, the HIV
prevalence rate of young women in Kenya would be one-third lower. Policies
that subsidize income, education, and HIV treatment are evaluated. I find that
education subsidy would reduce young women’s HIV risk most eﬀectively by
raising the opportunity cost of premarital childrearing.
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1 Introduction
HIV/AIDS is a major health risk facing young women in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Premarital sex is arguably the leading cause of their infection. However, it is docu-
mented that behavior response to HIV risk is limited in Africa, which is especially
true for young adults1. It is therefore of critical importance to understand what
influences risky behavior and what is the obstacle to behavior change. In this paper,
I explore the role of social and cultural norms regarding fertility played in African
women’s HIV risk. In particular, I examine how African women’s motives to bear
premarital children may aﬀect their HIV infection.
Fertility, or the ability to bear children, is highly valued in most African societies.
Motherhood is important for women’s social status and is an essential component of
married women’s identity. In many cultures, childless women suﬀer discrimination,
stigma and ostracism (Sembuya, 2010). For unmarried women, premarital fertility
is often encouraged in order to facilitate marriage.
Since unmarried women who want to marry a man compete with his other
girlfriends they may need to prove that they will be able to have children. In
many African societies the birth of the first child is customarily considered an
essential step in the development of a marriage ... Consequently, some women
are expected to have children before marriage in order to prove their fertility to
their future husband; others favour premarital pregnancy hoping that marriage
will follow. (Meekers and Calve`s, 1997)2
Strong incentives to bear children intensify women’s exposure to HIV infection
by increasing unprotected sexual activities. The risk of these activities increases if
they are premarital, a time when men commonly have several partners and are less
committed to the relationship. Indeed, overlapping sexual relations are considered
to be a major cause of the severity of the HIV epidemic in Africa (Epstein and Mor-
ris, 2011). Unprotected sex also enhances the chance of other sexually transmitted
1Oster (2012) reviews the literature and finds that the limited behavior change can be par-
tially explained by bias in OLS estimates and low non-HIV life expectancy in Africa, but these
explanations apply to married people only.
2This quotation cites the following work: Gaidzanwa, 1985; Radcliﬀe-Brown, 1950; Marguerat,
1983; Karanja, 1987, 1994; Paarup-Laursen, 1987; Lyons, 1991; Abe´ga, 1992; Dynowski-Smith,
1989; Karanja, 1994; Meekers, 1994; Schuster, 1979; Koussidji and Mueller, 1983; Obbo, 1987;
Orubuloye et al., 1994).
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infections (STIs) which are found to increase the HIV transmission rate dramatically
(Oster, 2005).
To check the validity of this hypothesis, I apply Kenyan women’s data from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and find that a woman who has a premari-
tal birth is significantly more likely to be HIV infected. In addition, my results show
that better-educated and wealthier women are less likely to have premarital births,
suggesting a reduction of HIV risk for advantaged women through the fertility chan-
nel.
Taking the observations delineated above into account, I construct a lifecycle
model that relates a woman’s lifetime decisions concerning sex, fertility and educa-
tion to HIV risk. The key ingredients of the model are as follows. A woman values
consumption and children, and decides her premarital sex type between committed
and casual sex, the number of children to bear before and after marriage, and the
fraction of time allocated to education versus work. Her income comes from labor
income and transfers from her sexual partner. There are two important events that
may occur in one’s life. One is marriage, which may bring more transfer from the
partner; the other is HIV infection, which would lower life expectancy and produc-
tivity. Both marriage and HIV infection follow Poisson process, with the arrival
rates directly aﬀected by premarital fertility and sex-type decisions. The premarital
fertility decision is crucial in this model and has both positive and negative eﬀects.
On the one hand, having more children not only brings more happiness, but also
increases the arrival rate of marriage. On the other hand, childrearing incurs time
costs to both work and education, and the eﬀorts to get pregnant amplify the HIV
risk by increasing unprotected premarital sex. The premarital sex-type choice be-
tween casual and committed sex also aﬀects income, marriage and HIV risk. Being
involved in casual relationships delays marriage and increases HIV risk compared to
committed sex. But it brings a fixed amount of transfers from the partner regardless
of the woman’s own income status. In contrast, committed sex is assumed to be
assortative matching and hence brings transfers from the partner proportional to
the woman’s own labor income. Therefore, casual sex may be more appealing than
committed sex if the woman’s own labor income is very low.
I allow women to be heterogeneous in their eﬃcacy of human capital accumula-
tion and preference for children, and then the model has the following implications
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for women’s behavior. First, women who have higher eﬃcacy in human capital accu-
mulation tend to have fewer children both before and after marriage, since children
incur more opportunity costs. Thus they are married at a later age. These women
are also more likely to engage in casual sex, as long as the costs in terms of HIV risk
and marriage delay are not too high. This is mainly because their labor income is
very low when they are young, a time when they choose to spend more time at school.
For them casual sex is a means of smoothing consumption over the lifecycle. Second,
women who have higher preference for children tend to have more premarital children
and hence are married earlier. They are also more likely to choose committed sex
which complements premarital births in facilitating marriage.
The model is calibrated to match data from Kenyan DHS. In particular, I cate-
gorize women by their education eﬃcacy and preference for children, and solve their
lifetime decisions numerically. The calibrated model matches data on births, mar-
riage age and HIV prevalence for women of both high- and low-educated groups very
well. Furthermore, I conduct counterfactual experiments regarding fertility motives
and policy experiments of subsidizing income, education, and HIV treatment. I con-
duct revenue-neutral exercises by equalizing the total amount of funding for all policy
experiments, so that policy eﬀects are comparable.
Counterfactual experiments show a substantial role of fertility motives in HIV
risk for Kenyan women, especially young women. First, if premarital births did not
facilitate marriage, the HIV prevalence rate of Kenyan women (aged 15-49) would
decline by 19 percent, and that of young women (aged 15-24) would decline by one-
third. The result is similar if Kenyan women’s preference for children was set to
be close to the US level. These are mainly due to a reduction of premarital births.
Second, even when the HIV transmission rate was reduced by two-thirds, to a level
comparable to that of the US, the role of fertility behavior in HIV prevalence would
remain considerable. When behavior response is allowed, the number of premarital
children would be increased by about 30 percent in response to the lowered HIV
transmission rate, and young women’s HIV prevalence rate would be reduced by one-
third. However, this rate would be reduced by two-thirds if behavior response was not
allowed. Third, my analysis shows that fertility motives do limit women’s behavior
response to increased HIV risk, especially for less-educated women. The number
of premarital children would be reduced by 15 percent when HIV risk doubles in a
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no-fertility-motives economy, compared to a 12 percent reduction in the benchmark
economy.
For policy experiments, I find that among the three types of subsidies, the educa-
tion subsidy is the most eﬀective in reducing premarital fertility and young women’s
HIV rate, since subsidizing education raises the opportunity costs of premarital chil-
drearing. The HIV treatment subsidy is the most eﬀective in reducing the average
HIV rate of all women since the treatment is also an eﬀective means of prevention.
But it is not as eﬀective in reducing the HIV rate of young women as the education
subsidy, as it incentivizes them to bear more premarital children which cause lower
risk to their health with the subsidy. The income subsidy has little eﬀect on HIV
prevalence even though it disincentivizes early marriage, since more income allows
for more premarital children due to the income eﬀect.
Related literature
This paper is first related to the literature of the relationship between HIV and
fertility. Research has looked at the eﬀect of HIV on fertility, as the latter influences
long-run economic growth by aﬀecting population size. For example, Fortson (2009)
constructs estimates of regional total fertility rate over time of SSA countries using
data from the DHS, and he finds that fertility response to the HIV epidemic in SSA
is insignificant. Juhn et al. (2013) find that although HIV infection significantly
lowers an individual woman’s fertility, local community HIV prevalence has little
eﬀect on non-infected women’s fertility. On the contrary, Young (2005, 2007) finds
large negative fertility responses to the HIV epidemic in South Africa that contribute
to welfare improvement in the long run. Kalemli-Ozcan (2008), however, finds a
positive eﬀect of HIV/AIDS on fertility in Africa in a cross-sectional, country-level
framework. Sociological and medical literature shows that many HIV-infected men
and women still intend to have children, despite the health risk imposed on their
partners, children and themselves (Cooper, et al., 2007; Paiva et al., 2003; Myer, et
al, 2007; Nakayiwa et al., 2006; Nattabi, et al., 2009; Smith and Mbakwem, 2007;
Peltzer et al., 2009). These studies, though suggest strong and pervasive fertility
motives in Africa, are subject to the reverse causality problem by ignoring the eﬀects
of people’s fertility choice on their HIV risk. In this paper, I argue that not only
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does HIV aﬀect fertility, but also HIV is an endogenous outcome of women’s fertility
choice. Furthermore, under my framework, fertility behavior aﬀects HIV risk not
only through its eﬀect on sexual behavior, but also through its interactions with
human capital accumulation and labor force participation.
This paper is also related to the strand of literature that investigates socioe-
conomic factors that aﬀect the HIV epidemic in Africa. For instance, economic
activities such as exports (Oster, 2012) and migration (Corno and de Walque, 2012)
are found to be positively associated with HIV prevalence due to the increasing con-
current sexual contacts by movements of people. On the high HIV risk among young
African women, it is argued that transactional sex (Epstein, 2008) and premari-
tal sexual relations (Meekers and Calve`s, 1997) expose young women to high risk.
Spousal search behavior, leading to a frequent partner turnover before marriage, in-
creases young women’s HIV risk in South Africa (Magruder, 2011). Using a fidelity
network model, Pongou and Serrano (2013) argue that the gender gap of HIV rates
in Africa can be simply explained by the configuration of sexual networks.
Despite the high HIV rates and corresponding high mortality risk associated
with risky sexual behavior, it is documented that behavior response to HIV has been
limited in Africa (Oster, 2012). Oster (2012) proposes that this can be partially ex-
plained by bias in OLS estimates and low non-HIV life expectancy in Africa. Kerwin
(2014) argues that the average small response can be attributed to the fatalistic re-
sponse by a subset of the population. However, both of the above studies empirically
find that their explanations only apply to married people, while the lack of behavior
change of young and unmarried women remains a question3.
Furthermore, literature has studied the relationship between HIV and education
or wealth empirically. The results are mixed, though most support a positive rela-
tionship due to the positive association between education and premarital sex. Using
data of five SSA countries from the DHS, Fortson (2008) finds a positive relationship
between education level and HIV rates in most sample countries. de Walque (2009),
however, finds no correlation between the two when adding more controls using the
3While some studies show that the behavior change is greater at some margins, for example,
Dupas (2011) finds that girls in secondary schools choose younger partners when they are told that
older partners are riskier, in general, various HIV education and prevention programs in Africa
turned out to have limited success in behavior change in condom use, premarital sex involvement,
number of sexual partners, etc. (Gallant and Maticka-Tyndale, 2004; McCoy et al., 2009).
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same dataset. Alsan and Cutler (2013) attribute the rapid HIV decline in Uganda
in the early 1990s to the rise in female secondary school enrollment that increased
the likelihood of abstaining from sex. Duflo et al. (2015) evaluate HIV interventions
in Kenyan schools and find that education subsidies alone, while reducing teenage
pregnancies, do not reduce STIs since they do not aﬀect casual sex; however, when
combined with an HIV education program that aimed at reducing casual sex, the
education subsidy successfully reduces STIs. Thus they argue that distinguishing
committed sex and casual sex is important for understanding policy eﬀects on teen
pregnancy and STIs. Case and Paxson (2013) argue that the eﬀect of education
on HIV infection depends on the availability of knowledge about HIV: when knowl-
edge of HIV was unknown, regions with higher rates of female education had more
prevalent nonmarital adolescent sexual activity and have higher HIV rates. Some
studies (e.g., de Walque, 2007; Lorio and Santaeula`lia-Llopis, 2011) incorporate a
time-varing dimension to the analysis of the education gradient and find a dynamic
relationship between HIV and education over time or over AIDS epidemic stages.
The lack of consensus on the relationship between HIV and education suggests
that the channels through which education is associated with HIV may be compli-
cated. In this paper, I provide a framework in which education is linked with HIV
through a fertility channel and a casual-sex channel. Under this framework, better-
educated women have a longer history of premarital sex and are more likely to choose
casual sex, which increases their HIV exposure, but they tend to reduce early preg-
nancy, which reduces their HIV risk, all of which are consistent with the empirical
findings in the literature. The overall eﬀect of education on HIV is ambiguous.
In terms of methodology, Greenwood et al. (2013) oﬀer the first quantitative gen-
eral equilibrium model of disease transmission with rational decision making. In their
paper, they model markets of diﬀerent types of sexual activities and allow monetary
transfers that clear the markets. Males and females make rational choices about
risky sexual behavior based on beliefs about its riskiness. Prior to their paper, most
economic research on HIV adopts empirical methods, including field experiments
(e.g., Duflo et al., 2015; Godlonton et al., 2014; Thornton, 2008). The few formal
models of risky behavior and HIV/AIDS that exist are more mechanic (e.g., Kremer,
1996; Magruder, 2011). There is a large epidemiological literature on HIV/AIDS
transmission, but it does not model decision-making and takes sexual behavior as
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exogenously given (see a review in Greenwood et al. 2013).
My paper adds to the relatively thin literature of modeling rational decision-
making related to disease transmission. I oﬀer a richer framework than most other
studies do. Moreover, other than simply modeling sexual behavior, I model more fun-
damental channels such as fertility and human capital accumulation that intensely
interact with sexual decisions. With this framework, I conduct policy experiments
that are less stylized. In Greenwood et al. (2013), policy experiments are conducted
by directly changing the value of certain parameters, for instance, the odds of in-
fection. Diﬀerent from theirs, I start with the funding for policies and show how
diﬀerent use of the same budget may have diﬀerent eﬀects on behavior and HIV
prevalence.
Finally, this paper is related to the broader literature of demographic transition
and economic development. In particular, it is linked to the fertility literature of
quality-quantity tradeoﬀ and the scant literature of birth timing. Empirical stud-
ies find a clear negative relationship between income and fertility (e.g., Jones and
Tertilt, 2008). A common interpretation is that the price of children is largely time,
and hence children are more expensive for parents with higher income who have a
higher demand for child quality, making quantity more costly (e.g., Becker, 1960;
Easterlin, 1968; Barro and Becker, 1989; Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990; Wang,
Yip and Scotese, 1994). The birth-timing literature mostly focuses on the relation-
ship between fertility decisions of birth timing and income, employment and human
capital accumulation. A general finding is that higher income or better education
delays births (Happel, Hill and Low, 1984; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Conesa, 2002;
Iyigun, 2000; Caucutt, Guner and Knowles, 2001; Mullin and Wang, 2002; Heckman
and Walker, 1990a, b; Bloemen and Kalwij, 2001; Gutie´rrez-Dome`nech, 2008; Tsay
and Chu, 2005). Another bulk of research focus on teenage births and the marital
status of women at the time of birth (e.g., Hoynes, 1997). However, most existing
models in the literature only allow binary or a small number of discrete decisions
regarding fertility, and do not allow women to optimize in a dynamic setting with
interactions of multiple decisions. Neither do they link fertility choice with HIV
risk. In contrast, my model allows women to decide the number of children pre- and
post-marriage, which, combined with sexual behavior and education choices, aﬀects
income, marriage, and health.
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To summarize, this paper first contributes to the literature by proposing a new
angle to look at young African women’s HIV risk that is rooted in social and cultural
norms regarding fertility. I oﬀer a rich framework in which women’s sexual behavior,
fertility, education and HIV risk are interrelated in a dynamic lifetime setting. This
framework incorporates diﬀerent channels of HIV infection, say, a fertility channel
and a casual-sex channel. While the literature generally emphasizes the latter and
argues that the high rate of HIV in Africa was caused by a high rate of casual sex,
my paper highlights the former, contending that strong fertility motives even in a
committed relationship can impose high risk as well. This is the first paper that
incorporates both channels of HIV risk in a dynamic lifetime setting. Further, by
quantifying the model, I conduct counterfactual analysis to decompose the eﬀect of
the fertility factor, and also compare various policy interventions under the same
budget constraint. My results indicate that it is important for policy makers to
take social factors, such as fertility motives, into account to make HIV intervention
programs more eﬀective.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the background about HIV
and fertility in Africa, and shows evidence of the relationship between the two in
Kenya. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 presents calibration, followed by
quantitative analysis in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Evidence
2.1 HIV and fertility background in Africa
HIV/AIDS is a major cause of death, currently killing about 2 million people world-
wide each year. The most aﬀected continent is Africa. It is estimated that more
than 24 million people are living with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, and more than
1 million die for AIDS-related cause each year, accounting for about 70 percent of
all people living with HIV and AIDS-related deaths in the world (UNAIDS, 2014).
Unlike western countries where HIV was mostly transmitted through male-to-male
homosexual contact and drug abuse, in Africa, the major transmission mode of HIV
is through heterosexual contact, and most of the infected population is female.
Young women are particularly vulnerable to HIV risk. Table 2.1 shows the HIV
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prevalence rate of young women aged 15-24 across countries and compare it with
young men. While in other parts of the world young women suﬀer slightly less, in
Sub-Saharan Africa the HIV prevalence rate of young women is about twice as high
as that of young men (1990-2013 average. UNAIDS, 2014). My study spotlights
one part of Africa: Kenya, where HIV prevalence rate is about 7.4 percent (that of
all women is about 8.6 percent), higher than the average of SSA countries (about 5
percent), and the HIV rate of young women is about 4.3 percent, versus 1.5 percent
of young men4.
The HIV determinant this paper highlights is fertility. Fertility is highly valued
in most African societies, and is a major means for women to maintain social status.
Naturally, Africa’s fertility rate is much higher than most other parts of the world.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the fertility rate is 4.9 births per woman, far above the US
level of 1.9 (World Bank).
Fertility and marriage are closely linked. A woman acquires an identity through
marriage and, most importantly, when marriage is fertile. Inability to have chil-
dren may lead to divorce or extra-marital relationships (polygamy). For unmarried
women, premarital births are often encouraged to prove their fertility and to facilitate
marriage5. However, not all births result in marriage and infidelity of men is even
more common (Meekers and Calve`s, 1997; Epstein, 2008). In Kenya, nearly half of
women who have children had their first pregnancy before their first marriage, and
only about half of these women had marriage follow within one year after pregnancy
(DHS for Kenya, or KDHS, 2008-2009; see data for more countries in Table 2.2)6.
4Though the HIV gap between young women and young men in Africa is striking, this paper
does not aim to explain this gap, which could be due to various causes (see literature review).
Instead, I try to decompose one risk factor for young women which is rooted in social and cultural
norms regarding fertility.
5Though there is no hard data from economic surveys that ask whether African women have born
children in order to facilitate marriage, sociological literature has widely documented this culture-
related behavior. For example, Obbo (1987) documents that “East African men from all groups and
socio-economic levels want proof of a woman’s fertility”, and thus premarital pregnancies do occur
among both uneducated and educated women who either yield to male pressures or want to speed
up matrimony. Furthermore, literature suggests that this culture may be dated back to centuries
ago. For example, according to Grandidier (1913) who summarizes the observations by European
travelers to Madagascar in the 18th and 19th century, premarital and extramarital fertility was
widely permitted in that society; men often chose wives who already had children as a proof of
their fertility, and even husbands seemed to not mind about extramarital fertility since fertility was
more valued than fidelity.
6Premarital pregnancy is computed from the KDHS data using the year and the month of the
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Better-educated women have lower premarital fertility rate and are married later. In
Kenya, women who have secondary school or higher education have an average of
0.74 pregnancies before marriage, and are married at about 22 years old, while those
with primary school or lower education have 1.19 premarital pregnancies on average
and are married about three years earlier than their higher-educated counterparts
(KDHS, 2008-2009).
Nevertheless, the culture regarding premarital fertiliy does not apply for every-
where in Africa, as premarital sexual and fertility behavior largely depends on eth-
nicity. While in some ethnic groups premarital sexual relations are fully permitted
and subject to no sanctions, others insist on virginity and prohibit premarital sexual
behavior (Murdock, 1967). Consequently, the prevalence of premarital fertility has
large variation across ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa (Garenne and Zwang,
2006)7. Kenya is a country where prevalence of premarital fertility is about 24 per-
cent, about the median level of SSA countries. The prevalence of premarital fertility
in Kenya varies substantially across ethnic groups, from 8.0 percent in Somali to
31.7 percent in Kamba (1989-2008, KDHS, computed by the author of the current
paper).
Surprisingly, despite the high fertility rate in Africa, infertility is also an impor-
tant public health issue in many African countries. In the so called “African infertility
belt” that stretches across central Africa from Tanzania in the east to Gabon in the
west, the infertility rate exceeds 30 percent in some countries (World Health Orga-
nization, 2003a)8. Major causes of infertility include sexually transmitted infections
first birth and the age at the first union. Due to the way of computation, the number of premarital
pregnancies is a lower bound estimate since miscarriages and abortions are not counted.
7Using the DHS data of 25 SSA countries, Garenne and Zwang (2006) study the relationship
between premarital fertility and ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa. They find that the prevalence of
premarital fertility, defined as the proportion of women who had premarital births, varies consid-
erably among the 263 ethnic groups examined, from 0.1 percent (Kanem-Bornou in Chad) to 76.2
percent (Herero in Namibia).
8There are two types of infertility – primary infertility and secondary infertility. The former
refers to couples who have not become pregnant after at least one year having sex without using
birth control methods. The latter refers to couples who have been able to get pregnant at least
once, but now are unable. Primary infertility rate is about 3 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and
do not vary much across countries. Most infertility in Africa is secondary infertility which varies
substantially across countries, and it exceeds 30 percent in some countries. According to Larsen
(2000), Kenya’s infertility rate of women aged 20-44 is 16 percent, slightly below the median of 28
sample countries in his paper.
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(STIs), pregnancy complications and unsafe abortion practices, which are aggravated
by poverty and substandard medical care (Cates et al., 1985). Although biologically
men and women have the same rates of infertility, the social burden falls dispropor-
tionately on women. A woman may be forced to divorce or enter polygamy if she
failed to conceive with her husband. The high infertility rates and social burdens of
infertility imposed on unconceived couples in Africa may provide the rationale for
social expectations of women to prove their fertility before marriage.
2.2 Evidence
In this section, I show evidence on the relationship between HIV infection, premarital
fertility, education and wealth in Kenya. I use data from the DHS for Kenya (KDHS).
The surveys provide household and individual level data, which includes women’s
sexual behavior, marriage, births history and other personal information9. Table 2.3
summarizes the key statistics. Below I show the main evidence, leaving details of
the regressions and data to the Appendix.
First, I examine the relationship between HIV status and premarital births. Table
2.4 shows the results10. It can be seen that in most specifications the coeﬃcients of
premarital births are positive and significant (mostly at 1 percent significance level).
The magnitude is also large: a woman who has a premarital birth is 3-6 percentage
points more likely to be HIV infected, which is large compared to Kenya’s HIV rate
of about 7.4 percent and women’s HIV rate of 8 percent.
I also conduct regressions using two subsamples. The first subsample includes
only women who had premarital sex, and the second excludes commercial sex11.
9I choose data of Kenya for two main reasons. First, Kenya is representative in the context of
this research. Kenya’s average HIV rate during 1990-2013 is about 7.4 percent (USAIDS, 2014),
above the average of SSA countries. The proportion of Kenyan women who have premarital births
is about 24 percent, about the median of SSA countries. Second, quality of Kenyan data may
be better as the refusing rate of HIV test in Kenya is relatively low (13 percent for 2003 and 8.5
percent for 2008). I also run regressions using data of other countries such as Malawi, Zambia and
Swaziland, and most results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
10The coeﬃcients displayed are transformed to marginal eﬀects computed at the sample mean, so
as the results below. I also examine the relationship between HIV status and premarital pregnancy
and the results are very similar.
The results presented emphasize the correlation between HIV and premarital births, rather than
causal relationship.
11I use the first subsample because in some regions or ethnic groups, premarital sexual behavior
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The results are shown in Table 2.5 and 2.6. It can be seen that the coeﬃcients
of premarital births are again significant and positive in all specifications, with the
marginal eﬀect about 3-7 percentage points.
In addition, I examine the relationship between education, wealth, and premarital
births, results of which are shown in Table 2.7. As can be seen, more education is
associated with lower premarital fertility, which is consistent for both education
measures. Wealthier women are also less likely to have premarital births in all
specifications. While not displayed in this table, women whose husbands have more
wives and whose rank among the wives is lower are more likely to have premarital
births.
In summary, casual empirical results show that women who have premarital births
are significantly more likely to be HIV infected, and better-educated or wealthier
women are less likely to bear premarital children.
3 A Lifecycle Model
In this section, I construct a continuous-time lifecycle model that relates a woman’s
decisions concerning sexual behavior, fertility and education to HIV risk. HIV in-
fection would lower one’s life expectancy and productivity. A woman optimizes her
lifetime utility by choosing the number of pre- and post-marital children to bear, her
premarital sex type between committed and casual sex, and the time allocated to
education. The chance of getting HIV primarily depends on the premarital fertility
and sex-type decisions. Premarital children facilitate marriage which may enhance
income through transfers from the partner, but they increase the chance of HIV in-
fection as well as incurring a time cost to work and education. Casual sex delays
marriage and increases HIV risk compared to committed sex, but is likely to bring
more transfers from the partner.
is prohibitive, and women are married at an early age, sometimes even before 15. This makes
premarital births almost impossible. I exclude this group of women since the fertility motives
focused in this paper are less relevant to them. The reason for using the second subsample is that
female sex workers may have a high chance to have premarital births due to high frequency of sexual
activities and possibly higher pay if the sex had no protection. Their premarital births are very
likely unwilling outcomes and are not relevant to the fertility motives underscored in this paper.
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3.1 Model setup
Time is continuous. It starts from the beginning of a woman’s fertile age (F ), and
ends at death (D) which is endogenous and will be discussed later. Throughout
her life, a woman values her consumption and children. At F , she decides the total
number of children to bear during her life (n), the number of children to bear before
marriage (n1), and her premarital sex type (s) between committed or casual. At
each point of time t she chooses the fraction of time allocated to education (q) rather
than work12. Her lifetime utility function is
12Some justifications are needed regarding women’s decisions.
First, it might be argued that African women do not have much bargaining power over fertility
decisions compared to men. While it is hard to observe in data who decides the fertility outcome,
DHS data does show that condom use is much more common for unmarried women (30%) than for
married women (less than 5%) in Kenya, suggesting that women do have some extent of controlling
power over their fertility outcomes, especially at the premarital stage. In addition, abortion is
fairly common in Kenya. It is reported that there are nearly 30 abortions per 100 births in Kenya,
suggesting that women may have the option of ending live births from unwanted pregnancy. Fur-
thermore, Field et al. (2015) argue that in Africa men and women do not have to agree on fertility
choice, since men can always have children with other women. Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that women make fertility decisions on their own.
Second, it might be argued that part of fertility outcome could be by accident rather than rational
choice. Although accidental childbearing could be common in Africa, DHS data shows that a high
percentage of pregnancies were wanted. For women (both all and never-married women) whose last
child was born in the last three or five years, about 80 percent of the children were wanted, and
most were wanted at pregnancy. To further alleviate this concern, another way of modeling could
be modeling fertility choice as fertility goals. The outcome could deviate to both directions at the
individual level, but the main results of this paper should not change much at the aggregate level,
as both fertility goals and fertility outcome can be viewed as a proxy of unprotected sex.
Third, the fertility and sex-type decisions are made at the beginning of life. This is a simplification
since dynamic choice of the two would make the model much more complicated. Given the focus
of this paper which is studying the impact of a culture on behavior, the results should not change
much at the aggregate level with the current assumption. In addition, this assumption is reasonable
since the eﬀect of being HIV infected on one’s fertility choice has ambiguous empirical predictions
(see literature review), and sex type may be considered as a choice of a lifestyle, or as an addictive
good, which can last long and should not change frequently.
Fourth, on the sex-type decision. In reality, the line between committed and casual sex may not
be very clear, since by some African culture it is possible for one, even a woman, to have committed
relationships with more than one partner at the same time (Epstein, 2008). But generally speaking,
I define casual sex to be the type of relationship in which one has no intention to enter marriage
and is more likely to have more than one partner at the same time, while committed sex is aimed
at marriage and hence one usually has only one partner at a time. Note that the sex-type decision
here is restricted to women. It is still possible for their male partners to be casual even if the women
are committed.
Finally, I assume that women start sexual activities from the beginning of their fertile age. Hence
there is no choice on abstinence. This is a simplified but reasonable assumption since the mean age
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V =
Z D
F
[ln(c) + ✓ln(1 + n1 + n2 · 1(M))   ln(1 + n1) · (1  1(M))]e ⇢tdt (1)
where n2 is the number of children after marriage (i.e., n2 = n   n1), 1(M) is the
indicator of being married, and ⇢ is the discount rate. ✓ measures her preference
for children relative to her preference for consumption, and   measures disutility
regarding premarital fertility13.
A woman maximizes her utility subject to the following conditions.
The budget constraint (the subscript t is skipped):
c+  y(n1 + n2 · 1(M)) = y + x (2)
Women are hand-to-mouth14. Living costs come from consumption and childrearing.
The childrearing cost is modeled as a fraction   of labor income per child, as literature
shows that childrearing costs are largely time costs. y is the woman’s labor income
at age t if she had no children and x is the transfer she gets from her partner. y and
x are determined by the following.
y = wh(1  q)(1  ⌘ · 1(I)) (3)
where w is the hourly wage per eﬃcient unit of labor, h is one’s human capital, q is
the fraction of time allocated to education at t and thus 1  q is the fraction of time
allocated to work, ⌘ is the percentage of productivity drop due to the HIV infection,
and 1(I) is the indicator of being HIV infected.
that Kenyan women had their first sexual intercourse is 14, about the age of menarche.
13Although in the model premarital children would benefit the woman by speeding up marriage,
they could still incur a cost, as a woman always faces the risk of being abandoned by the man who
fathers the child after pregnancy. Then the society may regard her not serious about sex, which
could hurt her future marital prospect. The disutility is a reduced form to capture this risk.
14I abstract from the asset accumulation decision for simplification which is reasonable for African
women. In Kenya, most of the population live under the poverty line with low saving rate (about
10 percent).
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x =
8<:x0 · (1  1(M)) + wh(1  q)('0 + 'M) · 1(M), if s = 0 (casual sex)wh(1  q)('0 + 'M · 1(M)), if s = 1 (committed sex)
(4)
that is, the transfer from the partner depends on one’s premarital sex type and her
marital status. If she chooses casual sex, before marriage she receives a constant
transfer x0 regardless of her own income status; after being married, she receives a
proportion ('0 + 'M) of her own labor income from her partner since marriage is
assortative matching. If she chooses committed sex, she is always matched with a
partner assortatively and receives a proportion '0 of her own labor income before
marriage, and this proportion increases by 'M after being married. I assume that
the sex type decision is only relevant before marriage – once married, the woman
always has committed sex with her husband, and the proportion of her labor income
that she receives from her husband equals ('0+'M) regardless of her premarital sex
type15.
Next, human capital accumulation is determined by
h˙ =  qh[1   (n1 + n2 · 1(M))](1  ⌘ · 1(I)) (5)
which depends on  , the eﬃcacy of human capital accumulation, q, the fraction of
time allocated to education rather than to work, the number of children (n1 before
marriage and n = n1 + n2 after marriage), and her HIV status. Childrearing costs
to education appear as time costs (a fraction   per child), which can also be seen
as a productivity loss. In particular, since under the African custom a girl would be
expelled from school upon pregnancy or the child birth,   is expected to be large.
Moreover, HIV infection reduces one’s productivity of education by a percentage ⌘.
Finally, there are three events that may occur in one’s life with Poisson arrival
rates.
15Assortative matching in committed sex is easy to observe in DHS data, which shows that
better-educated women are more likely to marry better-educated and professional men. For casual
sex, the constant transfer x0 can be viewed as the expectation of what one may receive from her
casual partners and is independent of her own income status. This is a reasonable assumption as
it is documented that in Africa, sex crosses social boundaries more frequently than in the West; it
occurs between rich and poor, urban and rural, and old and young (Anderson et al., 1991).
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One is marriage (M), the arrival rate of which is
 M =  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s) · (1  1(M)) (6)
that is, premarital children increase the arrival rate of marriage as they serve as a
signal of fertility16, and casual sex reduces the chance of marriage since it may hurt
a woman’s reputation in the marriage market. I assume that marriage is irreversible,
that is, once married, she will not divorce or separate, and marriage would last till
death.
The second is HIV infection, the arrival rate of which is
 I =  I [1 + n
 
1 · (1  1(M))][1 + (1  s) · (1  1(M))][1  1(I)] (7)
that is, both premarital fertility and casual sex increase the chance of contracting
HIV, an irreversible disease. Even if one did not bear premarital children and chose
committed sex, she is still subject to risk with the HIV arrival rate  I . Hence,
 I captures all sources of HIV risk other than premarital fertility and casual sex17.
As can be seen, the model incorporates two channels of HIV risk at the premarital
stage. One is the casual-sex channel as is emphasized by literature, attributing the
high rate of HIV in Africa to the high rate of casual sex which leads to concurrent
sexual relations. The other is the fertility channel, the emphasis of this paper. The
fertility motives would be stronger within committed relations, as committed sex
and premarital children are complements in facilitating marriage (see equation (6)).
Given the severe HIV conditions in Africa strong fertility motives would enhance
women’s risk by encouraging unprotected premarital sex. Figure 3.1 summarizes the
mechanisms through which the two channels work.
The last event is the death, which arrives at the rate  D if one is not infected by
HIV and  A if one is infected ( A >  D). Hence, death is an endogenous process as
well.
16The linear form of n1 is a simplification, but it is a reasonable assumption since more children
signal better fertility, which is highly valued in Africa.
17 I capures sources of HIV risk exogenous in the model, such as the the infection of a committed
partner, blood transmission, etc.
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3.2 Model characterization
In the model economy, a woman’s problem is to choose the number of children to
bear n and n1, her premarital sex type s and the fraction of time to education q to
maximize her lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the budget constraint
and human capital accumulation given by equations (2) - (5), taking marriage and
HIV risk into account (given by equations (6) and (7)).
There are two binary state variables (m, i) regarding marriage and HIV status,
as well as a state of sex type s when premarital, and three continuous state variables
(h, n, n1). Therefore, there are four possible binary states throughout a woman’s life
regarding marriage and HIV status: (M, I), (M, I), ( M, I), ( M, I). The HJB
equations of the four states are as follows18.
⇢V (h|M, I;n, n1) = maxq{ln(c) + ✓ln(1 + n)
+  A[ V (h|M, I;n, n1)] + @V (h|M, I;n, n1)
@h
· h˙} (8)
⇢V (h|M, I;n, n1) = maxq{ln(c) + ✓ln(1 + n)
+  I [V (h|M, I;n, n1)  V (h|M, I;n, n1)]
+  D[ V (h|M, I;n, n1)] + @V (h|M, I;n, n1)
@h
· h˙} (9)
⇢V (h| M, I;n, n1, s) = maxq{ln(c) + (✓    )ln(1 + n1)
+  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s)[V (h|M, I;n, n1, s)  V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)]
+  A[ V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)] + @V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)
@h
· h˙} (10)
18Note that in this model, death arrives at a constant arrival rate  D which is independent of
women’s age, so there is no term @V@t in the HJB equations.
On the notation of binary states, M (I) represents the state of being married (HIV-infected).
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⇢V (h| M, I;n, n1, s) = maxq{ln(c) + (✓    )ln(1 + n1)
+  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s)[V (h|M, I;n, n1, s)  V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)]
+  I(1 + n
 
1 )(1 + (1  s))[V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)  V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)]
+  D[ V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)] + @V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)
@h
· h˙} (11)
Equations (8) – (11) say that when one is in state (M, I) she is only possible
to change into the state of death (equation(8)) as marriage and HIV infection are
irreversible; when she is in state (M, I), she may turn into the HIV-infected state
with an arrival rate  I or death (equation (9)); when she is in state ( M, I), she
may get married with an arrival rate  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s) or die (equation (10));
and when she is in state ( M, I), she may enter marriage, be HIV infected or die
(equation (11)).
The HJB equations (8)-(11) can be used to characterize the choice of education
time q. For example, by taking first order condition of equation (8) one gets:
1
h(1  q) =
@V (h|M, I;n, n1)
@h
·  (1  ⌘)(1   n) (12)
which says that suppose @V (h|M,I;n,n1)@h is fixed, then q increases with education eﬃcacy
 , and decreases with HIV productivity drop ⌘ and the number of children n. This
is intuitive since the higher the education eﬃcacy, the more beneficial would be the
time spent on education; the high productivity drop due to HIV, the less would one
benefit from education; the more children one has, the less eﬃcient would be both
work and education. The characterizations of q for other states are similar.
The fertility decision is more complicated since it needs to be solved back to the
beginning of one’s life and there is no analytical solution to the value functions. But
qualitatively it can be influenced by the following factors. First, the benefit and cost
of children are happiness they bring about versus childrearing costs. For the former,
higher income increases fertility since children can be viewed as normal goods (i.e.,
the income eﬀect). But for the latter, since childrearing costs are time costs, women
with higher education eﬃcacy ( ) (hence higher potential labor income) would have
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fewer children due to higher opportunity costs of childrearing (i.e., the substitution
eﬀect). Second, the choice of premarital children has some additional eﬀects. The
additional benefit is that premarital births facilitate the arrival of marriage which
may bring more transfers, and the additional costs are that they increase the chance
of HIV infection, and incur a disutility cost as well. Hence, women with higher
education eﬃcacy may also have fewer premarital children due to higher opportunity
costs of childrearing, as long as the costs of marriage delay is not too high. Finally,
the higher chance do premarital births bring about marriage (i.e., higher ↵), the
more premarital children would women have. The more likely do they cause HIV
infection (i.e., higher  ), the more costly is HIV (i.e., higher ⌘ or  A), or the more
disutility does premarital fertility incur (i.e., higher  ), the fewer premarital children
would be born by women.
The sex-type decision is also made at the beginning of life and is aﬀected by the
following factors. The benefit of casual sex is that it would bring more current trans-
fers from the partner when the woman’s labor income is so low that proportional
transfers from a committed relationship would be very unappealing. The cost of ca-
sual sex is that it would delay marriage and also increase HIV risk. Therefore, under
reasonable conditions, a young woman with higher education eﬃcacy (i.e., higher
 ) would choose casual sex mainly because she would receive less from a commit-
ted relationship when she spends time at school and hence has low labor income19.
Moreover, since a woman has to bear more children once married, she would be
discouraged from early marriage if she would have accumulated more human capi-
tal. Casual sex would hence be less costly for women with higher education eﬃcacy.
Furthermore, premarital children and committed sex are complements in facilitating
marriage (see equation (6)), hence women who have higher preference for children
would bear more premarital children and are more likely to choose committed sex.
19It is also possible for a woman with higher education eﬃcacy to choose committed sex if
casual sex would delay marriage so much that she would lose transfers from marriage when she has
accumulated enough human capital and work more (thus has higher labor income). However, this
is a less likely case according to empirical literature, most of which shows that higher educational
level is associated with more casual sex.
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4 Calibration
I calibrate the model based on Kenyan women’s data from the DHS (2008). I group
all women aged 15-49 into four categories depending on their education eﬃcacy
( H and  L) and preference for children (✓H and ✓L), hence there are two-by-two
categories in total20. Education eﬃcacy is identified by a woman’s education level
which is secondary school or higher ( H) versus primary school or lower ( L), with
a population ratio of 1/2 based on KDHS (2008). Preference for children is identified
by the number of children, i.e., a larger number of children reveals higher preference
for children conditional on the education level. The population ratio of ✓H over ✓L
is 2/1, which is taken based on the population ratio of diﬀerent sex types that will
be discussed later.
There are 21 parameters to be determined: ✓H , ✓L, ⇢,  ,  H ,  L ⌘, '0, 'M , x0,
 H ,  L,  ,  M , ↵, ⇣,  I ,  , ,  A,  D. The main strategy is that I first compute most
of the parameters from literature or data, and then solve the rest by quantitatively
solving the model using value function iterations to match data moments. I transform
the continuous-time model to a discrete-time one and use one year as the base period.
The details of calibration are as follows.
Calibration of ⇢, ⌘,  D,  A,  M . These five parameters are taken or computed
directly from literature or data. ⇢, the discount factor, is set to be 0.05, as is typical
in the literature. ⌘, the percentage of productivity drop due to HIV, is set to be
0.05 as Manuelli (2015) does. For the parameters of the three arrival rates,  D is
computed from female life expectancy at birth in Kenya, which is 58.9 (World Bank,
2003-2013 average). Since the fertile age starts from menarche the median of which
is 15 in Kenya (Leenstra et al., 2005),  D = 1/(58.9  15) = 0.023.  A is computed
from the mean life expectancy at the time of being HIV infected. In Africa, the
average spacing between HIV infection and AIDS is 9.4 years, and between AIDS to
death is 9 months (Morgan et al., 2002), hence  A = 1/(9.4 + 0.75) = 0.099.  M is
the arrival rate of marriage if the woman had no premarital children and chose casual
sex. Of the four categories of women the highest mean marriage age is 23.47 (group
(✓L, H)). In data, this group of women have a positive mean number of premarital
20The two dimensions of heterogeneity, education eﬃcacy and preference for children, are assumed
to be orthogonal.
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children and are most likely to have casual sex. Thus I assume the mean marriage
age of women with casual sex but no premarital children to be 24, which generates
the value of  M to be 1/(24  15) = 0.111.
Calibration of  H ,  L,  . These are parameters related to human capital accumu-
lation and are computed using equation (5) h˙h =  q[1   (n1 + n2 · 1(M))](1  ⌘ · 1(I)).
I use this equation for two groups of women with high and low education eﬃcacy ( H
and  L), and employ the average of Kenyan women’s education eﬃcacy  ave (0.08)
computed from Schultz (2004, Table 5)21, hence obtain three equations to compute
these three parameters. I approximate the growth rate of human capital h˙h of the
two groups of women with the growth rate of their labor income y˙y , and proxy labor
income y by wealth index from the KDHS (use data of 2003 and 2008 to compute
the growth rate)22. I use years of schooling of the two groups to compute q, and the
number of children from data to obtain n1 and n2 of the two groups (KDHS, 2008)23.
21The average education eﬃcacy  ave is computed using Table 5 of Schultz (2004) by assuming
full-time schooling education (i.e., q = 1) and no birth or HIV infection, hence  ave = h˙h . Since in
my model wage diﬀerences totally depend on human capital diﬀerences, I equal wage growth rate
to human capital growth rate. I first compute implied private wage returns in percent per annum of
primary to secondary education (8.9) and secondary to university education (16.9) using regression
results from Schultz (2004) Table 5, and then compute human capital h of each education level. I
normalize human capital of women with primary or lower education to be one, then human capital
of secondary education equals one plus years of secondary schooling multiplied by the wage returns
per annum from primary to secondary education computed above (hsec = 1.54), and human capital
of university education equals hsec plus years of university schooling multiplied by the wage returns
per annum from secondary to university education computed above (hunv = 2.21); finally h˙h is
the average of the growth rate of human capital from primary to secondary education and from
secondary to university education, computed using the results from above.
22I use wealth index (variable hv270) from the KDHS 2003 and 2008 to proxy women’s labor
income. For each year, average wealth index of more- and less-educated women (aged 15-19 for
2003, and 20-24 for 2008) are employed to proxy average labor income of these two education groups,
and then the growth rate of labor income is computed based on the increase of wealth index from
2003 to 2008 of each group. The results are that the growth rate of income is 3.07 percent for
more-educated women, and 0.50 percent for less-educated women.
23The fraction of one’s time allocated to schooling q is computed using the fraction of schooling
years over a certain period for each education group. The years of schooling is about 12 years for
the better-educated group and 6 years for the less-educated group. Assuming schooling starts at
the age 7, then it ends at ages 19 and 13 respectively for the two groups. Hence q for group  H
and  L can be computed by: qH = (19  17)/(22  17) = 2/5, and qL = (13  12)/(17  12) = 1/5.
That is, for the  H group, for the sample used to compute income growth rate (aged 15-19 in 2003
and 20-24 in 2008) a typical woman ages 17 in 2003 and 22 in 2008, and during these five years she
continued education until the age 19. For women in the  L group, since they do not have education
after age 15, I assume their income growth rate from age 12 to 17 is the same as that from age 17
to 22, and during the five years from age 12 to 17, they continued education until the age 13.
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Calibration of '0, 'M , x0. These are parameters about transfers from the sex-
ual partner. I first use the equation that computes the mean income transfers
from nonmarital partners for all women Pr(casual) · x0 + Pr(committed) · wh'0 =
12.5% ·wMhM , where Pr(casual) (Pr(committed)) is the proportion of non-married
women who have casual (committed) sex, wM (hM) is the average eﬃciency wage
(human capital) of men, and 12.5% is the average fraction of a man’s income that is
transferred to his nonmarital sexual partner computed from Luke (2005). I also use
the equation '0 + 'M = 1+lcM/lcF2   1, where lcM (lcF ) is the average labor income
of men (women). This equation assumes that a woman equally shares the household
income with her husband after marriage. Additionally I assume x0 to be 0.6, which
is 60 percent of labor income of women with primary education or lower per unit of
time. This number is chosen to generate reasonable proportions of two sex types con-
sistent with data. In particular, I use the following data for the above computation.
Pr(casual) and Pr(committed) are taken based on KDHS data, which, however, is
unclear about a woman’s sex type. Greenwood et al. (2013) define casual sex as
having sex with nonmarital or non-cohabiting partner. If using their definition, I
would obtain the proportion of casual sex to be 67.5 percent for unmarried women.
But it may overestimate the proportion of casual sex since sex with non-cohabited
boyfriend may also be committed. To address this problem, I assume the proportion
of committed sex among women who have non-cohabited boyfriends to be 1/4, using
the average number of lifetime partners for both men and women24. This generates
the proportion of casual sex 52.3 percent. I therefore choose the population ratio
of ✓H/✓L to be 2/1 and presume all groups except for (✓L, L) group choose casual
sex, which is relatively consistent with the KDHS data for sex types of diﬀerent
groups. This produces the proportion of casual sex to be 5/9, close to 52.3 per-
cent as computed above. Women’s eﬃciency wage w is normalized to be one, and
men’s eﬃciency wage wM equals male-to-female hourly wage ratio taken from Winter
(1999)25. Average human capital of women and men (h and hM) is computed using
years of schooling from the KDHS and  ave (see footnote 21), and labor income lcM
and lcF are computed accordingly by multiplying the eﬃciency wage and human
24The average number of lifetime partners is 2 for women and 6 for men in Kenya, the average
of which is 4. Since most people (about 90 percent) are in monogamous unions, I assume 3 out of
4 are casual relations.
25Data is for South Africa in Winter (1999), and I take it as a proxy for Kenya.
23
capital taking labor participation rates into account 26.
Calibration of  H ,  L. These are parameters about childrearing costs to work. I
allow heterogeneity of   for the two diﬀerent education groups  H and  L since lit-
erature shows that better-educated people have higher demand of children’s quality,
hence spend more time on childrearing for each child. I calibrate the two parameters
by transforming equation (2) for the postmarital stage to cy+ n = 1+
x
y = 1+'0+'M ,
where cy is the consumption-output ratio taken from PennWorld Table (6.3), and the
number of children n for the two groups are taken from the KDHS.
Calibration of ↵, ⇣,  , . These are parameters of Poisson arrival rates of marriage
and HIV infection. ↵ and ⇣ are calibrated from equation (6) using the mean marriage
age and the number of premarital children of the two education groups ( H and  L).
  and  are calibrated from equation (7) using HIV prevalence rates and the number
of premarital children of the two education groups.
Calibration of  I ,  , ✓H , ✓L. I calibrate these last four parameters by solving the
model quantitatively. I transform the continuous-time model to a discrete-time one,
discretize the space of n, n1 and h, and use value function iterations to solve policy
functions of each group of women. In particular, I use the simplex-search method
to find parameter values to match the four targets: n and n1 of  H and  L groups,
by minimizing the distance of n and n1 of the two education groups from policy
functions and data.
Table 4.1 shows the calibrated parameter values, and Table 4.2 shows the model
and targeted values of certain variables, which are matched very well. Furthermore, I
simulate HIV prevalence rates using the calibrated parameters, and obtain the HIV
prevalence rate of all women to be 8.01 percent, comparable to the data value of
9.45 percent, and the HIV rate of young women to be 6.56 percent, very close to the
data 6.96 percent 27. HIV prevalence rates by age of the model and the data (for
women who had premarital sex, five-year moving average) are shown in Figure 4.1.
It can be seen that the HIV prevalence rate from the model is matched to the data
26The female/male hourly wage ratio is 0.85 (Winter, 1999, Table 11), and labor participation
rates of female and male are 27.2 percent and 42.9 percent respectively (Winter, 1999, Table 3). The
ratio of labor income lcM/lcF equals the multiplication of male/female hourly wage ratio, human
capital ratio and labor participation ratio.
27The HIV prevalence rates of data are for women with premarital sex only, who are more relevant
to my model.
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particularly well for young women.
5 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Counterfactual analysis
In this section, I conduct counterfactual analysis to examine the eﬀect of fertility
motives quantitatively.
The first set of experiments either turns oﬀ the channel that premarital births
facilitate marriage or alters women’s preference for children. The former is to turn oﬀ
the fertility motives highlighted in this paper, and the latter is to assess other factors
related to fertility. The first experiment assumes that premarital births have no
eﬀect on marriage by setting ↵ to be zero and  M equal  M of the benchmark model
excluding the multiplier of sex type component (i.e.,  M =  M_BM(1+↵BMn1_BM)).
The second experiment picks ✓ that makes women’s income elasticity of fertility close
to that of the US28. The third experiment sets   to equal ✓L so that for the group of
women with low preference for children, the disutility of premarital fertility totally
oﬀsets the happiness from premarital children.
Table 5.1 shows the results. It can be seen that removing the eﬀect of premarital
births on marriage arrival rate (↵ = 0) or increasing disutility of premarital births
(  = 0.87) has little eﬀect on the total number of children since they do not directly
aﬀect postmarital behavior, while lower preference for children (✓ = 0.55) reduces
the total number of children by about 40 percent. In all experiments, the number of
premarital children (n1) declines significantly. If premarital children did not facilitate
marriage, or disutility of premarital fertility was greater, women would choose to
have only about 0.7 premarital children instead of 1.05. Premarital fertility would
be even lower when women had lower preference for children. Interestingly, better-
28The US income elasticity of fertility is -0.38, taken from Jones et al. (2008). I use the simplex
search method to find the ✓ that makes income elasticity of fertility closest to the US level, which
produces the value of ✓ to be 0.55 and income elasticity of fertility to be -0.51. The reason that I
cannot find a value of ✓ that makes income elasticity of fertility exactly equal the US level is related
to the way I compute the elasticity: there are only two groups of women with diﬀerent income
( H and  L) when setting ✓ identical for all women, and hence the income elasticity of fertility is
computed only based on diﬀerence of fertility and income (or human capital) of the two groups,
i.e., ✏y = nH nLhH hL · havenave .
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educated women would be more aﬀected in these experiments as their number of
premarital children would drop more significantly than that of less-educated women,
hence their HIV rate would also drop significantly. This suggests that even though
better-educated women have fewer premarital children, their behavior and health are
also deeply influenced by fertility motives. In addition, the sex type of some groups
of women is also changed in the second and the third experiments. In the second
one, women of (✓H , L) type choose casual sex instead of committed sex (hence
all women choose casual sex) since they are now willing to have fewer premarital
children (and fewer total children as well), and premarital children and committed
sex are complements in facilitating marriage. In the third experiment, women of
group (✓L, L) choose committed sex instead of casual sex, since now premarital
fertility is less favored, but choosing committed sex helps speeding up marriage after
which they can enjoy more children. As a consequence, HIV prevalence rates decline
in all experiments. HIV prevalence rates of all women drop to about 6.5 percent
from 8.0 percent, and that of young women drop even more, to about 4.4 percent
from 6.6 percent.
Result 1. Had premarital births not facilitated marriage, or women’s value of
children been close to the US level, the HIV prevalence rate of young women in
Kenya would have been one-third lower.
In the second set of experiments, I look at how fertility behavior matters for
HIV prevalence. In particular, I change the HIV transmission rate by setting  I to
be one-third of its original value, since it is argued that the large diﬀerence of HIV
prevalence rate between Africa and the western world comes from the diﬀerence in
HIV transmission rates, and that this transmission rate per partnership in Africa is
about three times of that in the US (Oster, 2005). I examine how the change of HIV
transmission rate may aﬀect HIV prevalence when behavior response is allowed or
not. Table 5.2 shows the results. It can be seen that when the HIV transmission rate
drops by one-third, premarital children increase by about 30 percent when behavior is
allowed to change, and the HIV prevalence rate is then reduced to about 4 percent.
However, when behavior is not allowed to change, that is, when the number of
(premarital) children and sex type are fixed to be the same as in the benchmark
model, the HIV prevalence rate can be reduced to 2.7 percent for all women on
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average and 2.2 percent for young women. This suggests that even though the HIV
transmission rate matters, the role of fertility behavior in HIV prevalence in Africa
remains considerable.
Result 2. Had the HIV transmission rate been two-thirds lower, the HIV prevalence
rate of young women in Kenya would have been one-third lower. But this rate would
have been two-thirds lower had sexual and fertility behavior been fixed.
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show HIV prevalence rates by age of these experiments and
the benchmark model.
Finally, to link fertility motives to behavior responce to HIV risk, I increase the
exogenous HIV risk by doubling  I and check women’s behavior change in two sce-
narios: the benchmark economy in which premarital fertility facilitates marriage,
and an economy where premarital fertility has no eﬀect on marriage (i.e., ↵ = 0, and
 M =  M_BM(1 + ↵BMn1_BM)). Table 5.3 shows that in the benchmark economy
where fertility motives exist, the increase of exogenous HIV risk would reduce premar-
ital fertility by 12 percent, while the reduction would become 15 percent were there
no premarital fertility motives. This suggests that fertility motives do significantly
limit behavior change of women when facing an increase of HIV risk. Interestingly,
it can be seen that in the no-fertility-motives economy, women with lower education
eﬃcacy respond more to the risk by reducing premarital fertility compared with the
benchmark economy, while women with higher education eﬃcacy do not respond
to the increased risk. This suggests that premarital fertility motives have a larger
impact on the behavior change of less-educated women when facing higher risk.
Result 3. Had the exogenous HIV risk doubled, the number of premarital chil-
dren would have dropped by 15 percent had premarital fertility motives not existed,
compared to a 12 percent drop in the benchmark economy. This result is mainly
driven by a greater behavior change of women with lower education eﬃcacy in the
no-fertility-motives economy.
5.2 Policy experiments
In this section, I conduct policy experiments of the income subsidy, education subsidy
and HIV treatment subsidy to examine their eﬀects on women’s fertility choice and
HIV risk. All experiments are conducted under the same budget constraint in order
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to compare policy eﬀects. In addition, for each type of subsidy, I experiment on
sources of funding, say, internal funding (i.e., domestic tax revenues) and external
funding (i.e., international support). For internal funding, I experiment with labor
income tax and lump-sum tax. Compared to lump-sum tax, labor income tax adds a
substitution eﬀect that lowers the opportunity cost of childrearing. External funding
is experimented in order to check the income eﬀect. Income may aﬀect premarital
fertility choice in two opposite directions. Higher income may reduce premarital
children by lowering women’s incentive to enter marriage early, but may also increase
premarital children since children can be seen as normal goods and would be allowed
for given more income29.
5.2.1 Income subsidy
I evaluate income subsidy because in my model women’s fertility motives largely
come from income incentives – premarital fertility facilitates marriage which im-
proves women’s income status. I conduct five income-subsidy policy experiments
which diﬀer in the source of funding and groups of women to subsidize. In par-
ticular, the funding source can be either the internal funding (tax revenues) or the
external funding (the international support that generates a positive income eﬀect).
The women to subsidize can be either women with lower education eﬃcacy (hence
lower education and income) or all women. For experiments that subsidize only
low-income women with tax revenues, I experiment with a labor income tax and a
lump-sum tax. For the first experiment (labor income tax, subsidizing low-income
women), all labor income is taxed with a 5 percent rate30. The total amount of tax
revenues in this experiment is used as a benchmark for all policy experiments. That
is, for other experiments, I keep the total amount of funding the same as in the first
experiment and compute the subsidy rate (and the tax rate in internal-funding exper-
iments) to make the total amount of subsidies (and tax revenues in internal-funding
29Research shows that programs that are dedicated to distributing HIV information in Africa has
an overall limited impact on behavior. Hence this paper focuses on conditional or unconditional
cash transfers rather than pure information. This is highly relevant to reality as billions of dollars
have flown into Africa to combat with HIV, and in recent years some African countries also increased
domestic spending on HIV. How to use the funding eﬀectively can be a critical issue.
30Kenya’s labor income tax follows a progressive rule and the tax rates ranges from 10 to 30
percent (Kenya Revenue Authority, 2007). I take 20 percent, the average of the tax rates, and
assume one-fourth of the tax revenue is used for income subsidy, that is, a tax rate of 5 percent.
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experiments) equal the total amount of funding31.
Table 5.4 shows results of fertility and HIV rates for income-subsidy experiments.
It can be seen that the total number of children increases in almost all experiments.
In the external-funding experiments, women give births to more children due to the
income eﬀect, and in the internal-funding, labor income tax experiments even more
children are born because opportunity costs of childrearing become lower (i.e., the
substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect).
The number of premarital children also increases in most experiments, though
very slightly. For low-income women, the number of premarital children increases in
the EL experiment since more of them choose committed sex, and premarital chil-
dren and committed sex are complements in facilitating marriage. It also increases in
the internal-funding, labor income tax experiments due to lowered childrearing costs
to work. For high-income women (i.e., women with higher education eﬃcacy), pre-
marital fertility increases under the internal-funding, labor income tax policies due
to the substitution eﬀect of tax. It also increases under the EU policy since more
income allows more high-income women to choose committed sex which, combined
with premarital children, increases the chance of marriage.
As a consequence, HIV prevalence rates decline under the external-funding poli-
cies for all and for young women, but it increases under the internal-funding, labor
income tax policies, though the magnitude of changes is moderate in all experiments.
Figure 5.3 shows the HIV prevalence rates by age of the benchmark model and the
five income subsidy experiments.
These results suggest that the income subsidy may not be an eﬀective means to
reduce HIV rates, because even though higher income disincentivizes early marriage
and hence premarital births, it allows more premarital children due to the income
eﬀect. Subsidizing women with external funds is more eﬀective than with internal
funds, as taxing labor income reduces opportunity costs of childrearing and thus
encourages women to bear more premarital children, and also the external funding
has the potential of switching women’s sex type toward committed sex.
Result 4. An income subsidy policy would have little eﬀect on women’s premarital
31For all policy experiments, the simplex search method is used to find the subsidy and/or tax
rate in equilibrium.
In the internal-funding policy experiments I assume that subsidies to women are all funded by
tax revenues from women, i.e., there are no funds from men.
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fertility behavior and HIV prevalence in Kenya.
5.2.2 Education subsidy
The education subsidy is evaluated since data shows that better-educated women
have fewer premarital children, which lowers their HIV risk through the fertility
channel. Three experiments are conducted. In the first two, the subsidies are funded
with labor income tax and lump-sum tax respectively (i.e., the internal funding),
and in the third one they are funded with the external funding. In all experiments,
women who receive school education are subsidized proportionally to their education
time (q)32. The tax rate and the subsidy rate are computed so that the total amount
of subsidies (or the total amount of tax revenues) equals that in the income subsidy
experiments.
Table 5.5 shows the results. It can be seen that the total number of children
increases under the IUlc policy, mainly due to an increase of fertility of less-educated
women, whose opportunity costs of childrearing become even lower due to the tax
on their labor income (the education time of women with lower education eﬃcacy
does not increase even though education is subsidized, hence the only beneficiaries of
this policy are women with higher education eﬃcacy). The total number of children
decreases under the EU policy as fewer children are given birth to by more-educated
women; it decreases more in the IUls policy since less-educated women also bear
fewer children due to the income eﬀect.
The number of premarital children declines significantly for women with higher
education eﬃcacy under all policies, since subsidizing education increases their op-
portunity costs of bearing premarital children. But premarital fertility behavior
of those with lower education eﬃcacy is inelastic to the policy (actually increases
slightly in the internal funding experiments, because lower income incentivizes pre-
marital births to facilitate marriage). Women’s sex type does not change in any of
these experiments. As a consequence, the HIV rate of all women decline from 8.0 per-
cent to 7.3 percent (a 9-percent reduction), and that of young women declines from
6.6 percent to 5.6 percent (a 15-percent reduction). Almost all of the decline comes
from the fertility change of women with higher education eﬃcacy. The HIV rate
32Another way to do education subsidy is to subsidize education time net of childrearing cost,
i.e., q[1   (n1 + n2 · 1(M))], but the results are very similar to the current experiments
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under the EU policy is slightly lower than under the IU policies. Figure 5.4 shows
the HIV prevalence rates by age of the benchmark model and the three education
subsidy experiments33.
These results suggest that first, education-subsidy policies can be more eﬀective
than income-subsidy policies in reducing premarital fertility and HIV rates, since they
increase opportunity costs of childrearing. Second, women with higher education
eﬃcacy respond more to the education-subsidy policy since their opportunity cost
of childrearing would increase more. Finally, the education subsidy funded by the
international support is more eﬀective than that funded by domestic tax revenues,
as the latter reduces income of less-educated women and encourages them to bear
more premarital children to facilitate marriage.
Result 5. An education subsidy policy would reduce the HIV prevalence rate of
young women in Kenya by 15 percent, primarily driven by a reduction of premarital
children by women with higher education eﬃcacy.
5.2.3 HIV treatment subsidy
This set of experiments subsidizes HIV treatment (Antiretroviral therapy, or “ART”
in short). Again, three experiments are conducted depending on the source of fund-
ing, i.e., the internal funding – either labor income tax or lump-sum tax, and the
external funding – the international support. A lump-sum subsidy is granted to all
HIV-infected women for HIV treatment34. The tax rate and the subsidy rate are
again computed to make the total amount of subsidy (or tax revenues) match that
in the income subsidy experiments.
33These results seem to be inconsistent with Duflo et al. (2015), who find that education subsidy
alone, though reduces Kenyan school girls’ pregnancy, does not aﬀect their STIs. However, taking
into account the assumption of my model, my results actually coincide with theirs, as they find
that conditional on an HIV education program that provides more information about the risk of
casual sex to girls, education subsidy would reduce both pregnancies and STIs significantly. In my
model, I assume that women have perfect information about HIV risk, which plays the role of an
HIV education program.
These results are also consistent with Bandiera et al. (2012) who find that a program combining
improving knowledge of HIV risk and oﬀering vocational training to Ugandan girls significantly
increased self-reported routine condom usage.
34While the ART coverage for people living with HIV has increased dramatically to about 50
percent in recent years, in 2008, the year this analysis is based on, the coverage was still very
limited, below 20 percent.
31
In order to know the eﬀectiveness of the subsidy on a patient’s health, one needs
to know the price and the eﬀectiveness of the therapy. In recent years the price of HIV
drugs have dropped significantly and a generic copy of a triple-therapy antiretroviral
costs about 300 US dollars per patient per year. This transforms to about 37.5
percent of Kenya’s GDP per capita. Jordan et al. (2012) show that using three
antiretrovirals reduced progression to AIDS or death by about 75 percent. Since
WHO recommends that, in resource-limited settings, ART should be taken at the
advanced stage of HIV (World Health Organization, 2003b), the eﬀect of ART can
be considered to lengthen an HIV patient’s life from 10 to 13 years, an 30 percent
increase. This transforms to a decrease of  A, the death arrival rate of an HIV
patient, by about 23 percent. I also assume that ⌘, the productivity drop due to the
HIV infection, decreases by the same percentage as the death rate drop, because of
the improvement of life quality due to the treatment. In addition, ART is found to
be an eﬀective means of HIV prevention (i.e., treatment as prevention), as it reduces
HIV transmission rate by about 70 percent (Baeten et al., 2012). This transforms
to a reduction of  I by 70 percent35. Since the subsidy each patient receives may
not be adequate to purchase the full therapy, I assume that the proportion of the
eﬀectiveness of the subsidy to that of a full therapy equals the ratio of subsidy
received per patient to the full therapy price per patient per year.
Table 5.6 shows the results. It can be seen that while the total number of children
does not change much, the number of premarital children increases under all policies
for all groups of women. Because with the treatment not only is the cost of HIV risk
lower, but the risk itself is lower, it incentivizes women to take more risk and bear
more premarital children. As a result, HIV prevalence rates of all women decline
by nearly 20 percent mainly due to the reduction of the HIV transmission rate, but
HIV rates of young women do not decline as much as with the education subsidy
due to the incentive problem. Figure 5.5 shows the HIV prevalence by age in these
experiments.
These experiments suggest that, by means of prevention, HIV treatment policy
may be eﬀective in reducing HIV rates. But its eﬀectiveness for young women may
35Medical literature shows that if an HIV-positive person had received ART, the likelihood of
HIV transmission to his or her sexual partner would be greatly reduced. In this experiment, the
percentage change of  I is an approximation, as an accurate estimation requires network theory,
which is abstracted from in my analysis.
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be dampened as it incentivizes more premarital fertility36.
Result 6. An HIV treatment policy would eﬀectively reduce the HIV prevalence
rate for Kenyan women. But its eﬀectiveness for young women would be dampened
as it incentivizes premarital fertility behavior.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored the role of social and cultural norms regarding fertility
in women’s HIV risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using Kenyan women’s data, I have
documented evidence linking HIV risk with premarital fertility. I have thus con-
structed a lifecycle model that relates a woman’s lifetime decisions concerning sex,
fertility and education to HIV risk. Premarital fertility decision is the key element
of the model. Premarital births increase the chance of marriage, but enhance HIV
risk. I have subsequently calibrated the model based on the DHS data for Kenya and
conducted counterfactual analysis regarding fertility motives and policy experiments
of subsidizing income, education and HIV treatment.
Counterfactual experiments show that fertility motives play a substantial role in
HIV risk for Kenyan women, especially young women. Had premarital births not
facilitated marriage, the HIV rate of young women in Kenya would have been one-
third lower. Policy experiments show that the education subsidy is the most eﬀective
in reducing premarital fertility and the HIV rate of young women, by raising the op-
portunity cost of premarital childrearing. The HIV treatment subsidy, though would
eﬀectively reduce the average women’s HIV rate by preventing HIV transmission, is
not as eﬀective as the education subsidy for young women since it incentivizes them
to bear more premarital children. The income subsidy has only moderate eﬀects
on the HIV rate, as more income allows for more premarital children. Overall, my
results suggest that strong fertility motives in Africa impose considerable risk on
women’s sexual health, and policy makers ought to take this factor into account to
make HIV intervention programs more eﬀective.
36This result is inconsistent with Oster (2005), who argues that treating other STIs can be very
eﬀective in reducing HIV in Africa, as it reduces the HIV transmission rate. However, in her paper,
she does not model endogenous behavior, while my analysis shows that reducing exogenous risk
may not be very eﬀective since it would incur incentive problems.
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There are, though, some limitations of this paper. First, the model is a partial
equilibrium. Policy eﬀects could be diﬀerent if we consider general equilibrium eﬀects,
for instance, taking into account bargaining process between men and women. One
possible result could be that policy eﬀects would be greater if I built in bargaining,
as the subsidy would increase women’s bargaining power in the marriage market,
which would reduce premarital births for signaling purposes. Second, it is always
hard to exactly identify “fertility motives” in data, as data do not show whether
the children were born due to fertility motives or by accident. Nonetheless, data do
show that most premarital children were wanted at the time of pregnancy, which may
alleviate this concern. Hence, the impact of fertility motives on HIV would still be
substantial even if we consider accidental childbearing. Finally, this paper is open to
more policy recommendations. Fertility motives are rooted in culture, but poverty,
inequality, and discrimination against women could be deeper soil upon which the
risk was developed.
34
Tables and Figures
Table 2.1. HIV prevalence of young women versus young men
F 15 24 M15 24 F 15 24 M15 24
SSA 3.2 1.5 North America < 0.1 0.2
Uganda 4.1 2.4 Asia & Pacific < 0.1 0.1-0.2
Kenya 4.3 1.5 West&Cen Europe < 0.1 0.2
Malawi 7.8 4.2 Latin America 0.15 0.3
Botswana 11.5 6.3 India 0.2 0.3
Zimbabwe 12.0 6.7 Pakistan < 0.1 < 0.1
South Africa 12.7 3.9 Indonesia < 0.5 < 0.5
Notes: This table shows the HIV prevalence rates of young women aged between 15 and 24 (F15 24)
across countries and compare it with young men (M15 24). Data are from UNAIDS (2014).
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Table 2.2. Premarital fertility and marriage following pregnancy
country %premarital pregnancy %marriage < 1yr year
Senegal 26 60 2010
Cameroon 35 47 2011
Kenya 47 51 2008
Uganda 52 8 2011
Malawi 29 70 2010
Lesotho 31 63 2009
Zimbabwe 40 67 2010
Swaziland 73 23 2006
South Africa 57 27 1998
Notes: This table reports the percentage of women who had the first pregnancy before the first mar-
riage and the percentage of these women who were married within one year after the first pregnancy.
Only women who have children are counted. Note that premarital pregnancy is computed from
the DHS data using the year and month of the woman’s first birth and her age at the first union.
Hence, only pregnancies that led to live births are counted and are thus lower bound estimates.
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Table 2.3. Summary statistics
HIV prevalence rate
all women 7.98%
young women (age 15-24) 4.55%
edu: primary or lower 8.54%
edu: secondary or higher 6.91%
% of women who have premarital births 24.60%
% of women who have premarital pregnancy 47.40%
average number of children
edu: primary or lower 5.38
edu: secondary or higher 3.35
average number of premarital children
edu: primary or lower 1.19
edu: secondary or higher 0.74
average first marriage age
edu: primary or lower 19.26
edu: secondary or higher 22.17
% of women who have secondary/higher education 33.63%
average years of schooling 7.70
Notes: Data are from the DHS for Kenya (2008). This table deserves more explanations. First,
HIV prevalence rates listed are for all women aged 15-49, but women who have premarital sex are
more relevant to the context of this paper (the fraction of this group is about 87 percent of all
women). Their HIV rates are higher than the average rates of all women. For these women, HIV
rates are 9.45% for all of them, 6.96% for young women, 10.15% for the less-educated, and 8.17%
for the better-educated. Second, the number of children and premarital children, and the age at
the first marriage the average of women aged 35-40 who had premarital sex from the KDHS (2008).
The reason for choosing this age cohort is that for younger women, they may continue to have
more children and will be married in the future if not yet, so including them does not well capture
women’s life profile of marriage and fertility; for older women, their marriage and fertility may be
very diﬀerent from a typical woman on average due to cohort eﬀects. Third, education level and
years of schooling are for women aged 25 or older, since younger women may not have finished
education yet. Finally, all statistics are sample-weighted using weights provided in the DHS. Most
of the variable values are used as targets in the calibration section.
The number of premarital children is computed in the following way. The DHS contains infor-
mation of women’s age at the first union and at the first child birth, and the current age of all living
children. Using this data I compute women’s age at the birth of each child, and then the number
of (living) children born before their first marriage. Note that here birth ages are transformed to
pregnancy ages.
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Table 2.4. Premarital births and HIV infection
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (2003, 2008). The logistic model is used
for regressions. Coeﬃcients displayed are transformed to marginal eﬀects computed at the sample
mean. The dependent variable is a woman’s HIV test result (1 if positive, and 0 if negative).
Prembth is computed using a woman’s age at the first birth of her child and her age at the first
union (1 if a woman’s first child was born before her first marriage, and 0 otherwise). Edu is a
dummy of a woman’s education level. urban is a dummy of whether a woman lives in an urban
area. Ln_NoPartners is a woman’s number of lifetime partners in logs. Occupation is a dummy
of standardized respondent’s occupation groups. WealthID is the wealth index of a woman’s
household ranging from 1 to 5 (poorest to richest). No_wife is the number of wives of a woman’s
husband, and wife_rank is the woman’s rank among her husband’s wives. Region is the region
where a woman lives (dummy). Y ear is the year of the survey (dummy). Cohort is a dummy of a
woman’s birth year. Age is a woman’s age the time of survey. Ethnicity and Religion are dummies
of a woman’s ethnic and religious groups. Age at 1st union is a woman’s age at her first union
(marriage). Knowledge is a woman’s knowledge about contraception methods and HIV prevention
methods (dummy).
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10
percent level.
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Table 2.5. Subsample 1 – premarital sex
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (2003, 2008). I restrict the sample for regres-
sions to women who had premarital sex. The logistic model is used for regressions. Coeﬃcients
displayed are transformed to marginal eﬀects computed at the sample mean. The dependent vari-
able is a woman’s HIV test result (1 if positive, and 0 if negative). All the independent variables
are the same as in Table 2.2.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10
percent level.
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Table 2.6. Subsample 2 – non-commercial sex
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (2003, 2008). I restrict the sample for regres-
sions to women who are not involved in commercial sex. The logistic model is used for regressions.
Coeﬃcients displayed are transformed to marginal eﬀects computed at the sample mean. The de-
pendent variable is a woman’s HIV test result (1 if positive, and 0 if negative). All the independent
variables are the same as in Table 2.2.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10
percent level.
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Table 2.7. Education, wealth, and premarital births
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008). The logistic
model is used for regressions. The dependent variable is a woman’s premarital birth (1 if she has a
premarital birth, and 0 if not). All the independent variables are the same as in Table 2.2, except
for ln_eduyear, which is a woman’s years of schooling in logs, and sexage, which is a dummy of a
woman’s age at her first sex.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10
percent level.
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Table 4.1. Parameter values, lifecycle model
Tastes ✓H = 1.34, ✓L = 0.87, ⇢ = 0.05,   = 0.25
Childrearing cost  H = 0.25,  L = 0.16
Human capital accumulation  H = 0.16,  L = 0.04,   = 0.72
Transfers from the partner '0 = 0.13, 'M = 0.60, x0 = 0.60
HIV productivity drop ⌘ = 0.05
Arrival rates
 M = 0.11, ↵ = 0.35, ⇣ = 0.74
 I = 0.0072,   = 3.79,  = 0.077
 D = 0.023,  A = 0.0985
Notes: This table reports the calibrated parameter values of the lifecycle model.
Table 4.2. Calibration results, model and targeted values
Model Target
Total number of children
nH 3.20 3.35
nL 5.37 5.38
Number of premarital children
n1H 0.79 0.74
n1L 1.18 1.19
Marriage age
MageH 22.24 22.17
MageL 19.59 19.26
HIV prevalence rate
HIV prH 7.94% 8.04%
HIV prL 8.04% 11.31%
Notes: This table reports the values of eight variables from the calibrated model and the target.
The targeted values are based on the DHS (2008) for Kenyan women.
42
Table 5.1. Counterfactual analysis: fertility motives
BM ↵ = 0 ✓ = 0.55   = 0.87
n 4.64 4.62 2.73 4.62
n1 1.05 0.73 0.60 0.68
n1H 0.79 0.23 0.00 0.01
n1L 1.18 0.98 0.90 1.02
HIV pr 8.01% 6.50% 6.65% 6.49%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 4.35% 4.47% 4.40%
HIV prH 7.94% 5.79% 5.79% 5.80%
HIV prL 8.04% 6.85% 7.10% 6.85%
schange  L ! 0  L ! 1
Notes: This table reports the results of the counterfactual analysis regarding fertility motives. n
is the total number of children per woman. n1 is the number of premarital children per woman,
n1H (n1L) is the number of premarital children per more-educated (less-educated) woman. HIV pr
is the HIV prevalence rate of all women (aged 15-49). HIV pryoung is the HIV prevalence rate
of young women (aged 15-24). HIV prH (HIV prL) is the HIV prevalence rate of more-educated
(less-educated) women. schange is the change of sex type, where  i ! s means more women of
education group i choose sex type s. Column one shows the variable values from the benchmark
model, and column two to four show the results of the three counterfactual experiments.
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Table 5.2. Counterfactual analysis: behavior
BM Y ES NO
n 4.64 4.62 4.64
n1 1.05 1.40 1.05
n1H 0.79 1.03 0.79
n1L 1.18 1.58 1.18
HIV pr 8.01% 4.03% 2.71%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 4.27% 2.23%
HIV prH 7.94% 3.85% 2.70%
HIV prL 8.04% 4.13% 2.72%
Notes: This table reports the results of counterfactual analysis regarding behavior.  I is set to
be one-third of its original value (i.e.,  I = 0.0024), and its eﬀect on HIV rates is examined when
behavior response is allowed or not. The variables reported in this table are the same as in Table
5.1. Column one (BM) shows variable values from the benchmark model. Column two shows the
results when behavior change is allowed, and column three shows the results when behavior is fixed
to be the same as in the benchmark model.
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Table 5.3. Counterfactual analysis: behavior change
% change BM ↵ = 0
n 0.00 0.48
n1 -12.08 -15.24
n1H -7.63 0.00
n1L -13.56 -17.01
Notes: This table reports the percentage change in the number of children in two economies, when
 I doubles: one benchmark model in which fertility motives exist (Column one, BM), and the
other in which premarital children do not aﬀect marriage arrival rate (Column two, ↵ = 0). The
variables reported in this table regarding fertility are the same as in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.4. Policy experiment, income subsidy
BM ILlc ILls EL IUlc EU
n 4.64 4.79 4.64 4.71 4.81 4.71
n1 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05
n1H 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.80
n1L 1.18 1.19 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.18
HIV pr 8.01% 8.11% 8.01% 7.75% 8.11% 7.68%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 6.72% 6.56% 6.28% 6.72% 6.18%
HIV prH 7.94% 8.07% 7.94% 7.94% 8.07% 6.97%
HIV prL 8.04% 8.13% 8.04% 7.66% 8.13% 8.04%
schange  L ! 1  H ! 1
Notes: This table reports the results of the income subsidy policy. The variables reported in this
table are the same as in Table 5.1. Column one (BM) shows the variable values from the benchmark
model. Column two (ILlc) shows the results of the income subsidy funded by the internal funding
(labor income tax) and subsidizing only less-educated women. Column three (ILls) shows the
results of the income subsidy funded by the internal funding (lump-sum tax) and subsidizing only
less-educated women. Column four (EL) shows the results of the subsidy funded by the external
funding and subsidizing less-educated women. Column five (IUlc) shows the results of the income
subsidy funded by the internal funding (labor income tax) and subsidizing all women uniformly.
Column six (EU) shows the results of the subsidy funded by the external funding and subsidizing
all women.
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Table 5.5. Policy experiment, education subsidy
BM IUlc IUls EU
n 4.64 4.72 4.58 4.62
n1 1.05 0.92 0.92 0.91
n1H 0.79 0.37 0.36 0.37
n1L 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.18
HIV pr 8.01% 7.37% 7.37% 7.32%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 5.68% 5.67% 5.59%
HIV prH 7.94% 5.91% 5.89% 5.91%
HIV prL 8.04% 8.13% 8.13% 8.04%
Notes: This table reports the results of the education subsidy policy. The variables reported in
this table are the same as in Table 5.1. Column one (BM) shows the variables values of the
benchmark model. Column two (IUlc) shows the results of the education subsidy funded by the
internal funding (labor income tax) and subsidizing all women. Column three (IUls) shows the
results of the education subsidy funded by the internal funding (lump-sum tax) and subsidizing all
women. Column four (EU) shows the results of the education subsidy funded by external funding
and subsidizing all women.
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Table 5.6. Policy experiment, HIV treatment subsidy
BM IUlc IUls EU
n 4.64 4.74 4.58 4.62
n1 1.05 1.28 1.28 1.28
n1H 0.79 0.96 0.94 0.95
n1L 1.18 1.45 1.45 1.45
HIV pr 8.01% 6.60% 6.49% 6.49%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 5.98% 5.85% 5.85%
HIV prH 7.94% 6.42% 6.23% 6.23%
HIV prL 8.04% 6.69% 6.62% 6.62%
Notes: This table reports the results of the HIV treatment subsidy policy. The variables reported
in this table are the same as in Table 5.1. Column one (BM) shows the variables values of the
benchmark model. Column two (IUlc) shows the results of the treatment subsidy funded by the
internal funding (labor income tax) and subsidizing all HIV-infected women. Column three (IUls)
shows the results of the treatment subsidy funded by the internal funding (lump-sum tax) and
subsidizing all HIV-infected women.Column four (EU) shows the results of the treatment subsidy
funded by external funding and subsidizing all HIV-infected women.
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Figure 3.1. Channels of HIV risk: fertility channel and casual-sex channel
Notes: This figure explains the two channels of HIV risk at the premarital stage. One is casual-sex
channel, which increases women’s HIV risk by increasing their exposure to concurrent or overlapping
sexual relations. The other is the fertility channel, the emphasis of this paper and may be more
common within committed relations, since in casual relations it may be hard to identify the father
of the child and thus marriage may not follow as quickly. Given the severe HIV conditions in Africa,
strong fertility motives can add to women’s HIV risk by encouraging unprotected premarital sex.
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Figure 4.1. HIV prevalence by age: data and model
Notes: This figures shows the HIV prevalence rate of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the
model and the data. The data are from the DHS (2008) for Kenyan women.
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Figure 5.1. HIV prevalence, counterfactual experiments: fertility motives
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence rate of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the
benchmark model and the three counterfactual experiments regarding fertility motives.
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Figure 5.2. HIV prevalence, counterfactual experiments: behavior change
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence rate of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the
benchmark model and the counterfactual experiments regarding behavior change.  I is set to be
one-third of its original value (i.e.,  I = 0.0024), and its eﬀect on HIV rates is examined when be-
havior response is allowed or not. “Behavior” means behavior change is allowed, and “no behavior”
means behavior is fixed to be the same as in the benchmark model.
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Figure 5.3. HIV prevalence, income subsidy
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence rate of all women by age (15-49) from the benchmark
model and four income subsidy policy experiments. “inc IL” is the result of the income subsidy
funded by the internal funding and subsidized only to less-educated women. “inc IU” is the result of
the income subsidy funded by the internal funding and subsidized uniformly to all women. “inc EL”
is the result of the subsidy funded by the external funding and subsidizing less-educated women.
“inc EU” is the result of the subsidy funded by the external funding and subsidizing all women.
The subscript “lc” means internal funding is raised from labor income tax, and the subscript “ls”
means internal funding is raised from lump-sum tax.
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Figure 5.4. HIV prevalence, education subsidy
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the bench-
mark model and two education subsidy policy experiments. “edu IU” is the result of the education
subsidy funded by the internal funding and subsidized to all women. “edu EU” is the result of
the education subsidy funded by external funding and subsidized to all women. The subscript
“lc” means internal funding is raised from labor income tax, and the subscript “ls” means internal
funding is raised from lump-sum tax.
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Figure 5.5. HIV prevalence, treatment subsidy
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the bench-
mark model and two HIV treatment subsidy policy experiments. “ART IU” is the result of the
education subsidy funded by the internal funding and subsidized to all HIV-infected women. “ART
EU” is the result of the education subsidy funded by external funding and subsidized to all HIV-
infected women. The subscript “lc” means internal funding is raised from labor income tax, and
the subscript “ls” means internal funding is raised from lump-sum tax.
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Appendix
This appendix provides more details about the Evidence section.
Data is taken from Kenyan DHS surveys, which cover five years: 1989, 1993,
1998, 2003, 2008. The last two surveys contain results of HIV tests of a randomly
selected subsample of the normal surveys. For regressions I use data from 2003 and
2008 surveys if HIV test results are needed and all years’ data otherwise. Below I
explain the regression model and data.
Premarital births and HIV
The hypothesis is that premarital births increase HIV infection probability by in-
creasing unprotected premarital sexual activity. I use the logistic probability model
for regression.
HIVi =  0 +  1prembthi +  2Xi + "i
where the dependent variable HIVi is a dummy which equals one if a woman i’s HIV
test result is positive, and zero if it is negative. Prembthi is a dummy computed
by the author which equals one if a woman i’s first child was born before her first
marriage, and zero otherwise. Xi is a set of control variables including women’s
age and cohort, living area and region, ethnicity, religion, age at the first marriage,
education, knowledge about contraception and HIV prevention, number of partners,
occupation and wealth. A detailed description of variables is as follows.
HIV : is the dependent variable. It is the HIV test result of a randomly selected
subsample of the normal sample of the DHS. The corresponding DHS variable is
hiv03.
Prembth: is a dummy variable which equals one if a woman’s first birth was
before the first union (marriage). It is computed using the DHS variable v212 (age
at the first birth) and v511 (age at the first union).
Edu: is a dummy variable of a woman’s education level, including no education,
primary school, secondary school, and higher. I add this variable since education level
may aﬀect both premarital fertility and HIV infection through its eﬀect on sexual
and fertility behavior. The corresponding DHS variable is v106 (highest education
attended)
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Urban: is a dummy variable that equals one if a woman lives in an urban area
and zero if in she lives in a rural area. The corresponding DHS variable v102 (type
of place of residence where the respondent was interviewed as either urban or rural).
Region: is a dummy variable of a woman’s living region that includes eight
provinces in Kenya. The corresponding DHS variable is v101 (region in which the
respondent was interviewed).
I use urban and region variables because sexual and fertility behavior may vary
across urban/rural areas and regions due to variations of culture, customs, ethnicity
and religion.
Y ear: is a dummy variable of the year of the survey.
Birthyear: is a dummy variable of a woman’s year of birth. This variable is used
to capture women’s cohort eﬀects. The corresponding DHS variable is v010 (year of
birth of the respondent).
Age: is the age of the respondent at the time of survey. Age2 is also included in
regressions. The corresponding DHS variable is v012.
I use year, birthyear, age and age2 since both fertility behavior and HIV preva-
lence may change over the years and cohorts, and may follow a quadratic pattern
over the lifecycle.
Ethnicity: is a woman’s ethnicity. The corresponding DHS variable is v131.
Religion: is a woman’s religion. The corresponding DHS variable is v130.
I include ethnicity and religion variables since these cultural factors have great
influences on women’s premarital sexual and fertility behavior and HIV status (see
the background section).
Age at the first union: is a woman’s age at her first union (marriage). It is
included because the age at marriage may be associated with premarital fertility. A
woman who is married later may have more premarital births due to the lengthened
spacing between menarche and marriage, but may also have fewer premarital children
since premarital births facilitate the arrival of marriage. The age at marriage may
also aﬀect HIV status as studies show that delayed marriage is linked to higher HIV
infection rate through an increase of premarital sex. The corresponding DHS variable
is v511.
Contraception knowledge: is a dummy variable of a woman’s knowledge about
any contraception method classified into modern, traditional and folkloric methods.
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The corresponding DHS variable is v301.
HIV prevention knowledge: is a dummy of whether a woman knows always
using condoms during sex would reduce their chance of getting AIDS. The corre-
sponding DHS variable is v754CP .
I include Contraception knowledge and HIV prevention knowledge since they
aﬀect both HIV transmission and fertility outcome.
In some regressions, I also add the following control variables.
Occupation: is a dummy variable of the standardized respondent’s occupation
groups in ten categories. I add this variable because women’s sexual behavior and
fertility outcome may be influenced by their occupation. The corresponding DHS
variable is v717.
ln_NoPartners: is a woman’s lifetime number of sexual partners in logs. I use
this variable to control sex style of a woman (more partners implies more casual
sex conditional on other variables) which is correlated with both HIV status and
premarital fertility. The corresponding DHS variable is v836.
WealthID: is a dummy variable of household wealth index ranged from one
to five representing wealth status from poorest to richest. The corresponding DHS
variable is hv270.
No_wife: is a dummy variable of the number of other wives a woman’s husband
currently has. The corresponding DHS variable is v505.
Wife_rank: is a dummy variable of the rank of a woman among the partner’s
wives. The corresponding DHS variable is v506.
I use wealthID, No_wife, wife_rank variables to proxy a woman’s wealth
before marriage. By assuming assortative matching, wealth status of a married
woman’s household implies her wealth status before marriage. But this implication
may not be correct if the woman enters a polygyny, i.e., she married a rich man but
her rank among the wives is low. Hence I also include the number of wives and one’s
rank among the wives to better proxy her wealth status before marriage.
For subsample regressions, I use the age of the first sexual intercourse (the DHS
variable v525) to identify premarital sex, and use the variable that asked with whom
the woman had sex (v767a, v767b, v767c) to identify those who had commercial sex.
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Education, wealth and premarital births
I again use logistic model with the following specification.
prembthi =  0 +  1edui +  2wealthi +  3Xi + "i
where prembth is defined in the same way as in the previous section. For edu I use
two measures. One is education level, and the other is the number of schooling years
(in logs). For wealth I use wealth index, the number of wives of one’s husband and
her rank among the wives to proxy her wealth status before marriage. Xi represents
control variables, including women’s age and cohort, living area and region, ethnicity,
religion, age at the first marriage, age at the first sex, knowledge about contraception
and HIV prevention and occupation. A detailed description of variables is as follows.
Prembth: is the dependent variable and is defined in the same way as in the
previous regression.
Edu: there are two measures of education. One is education level which is
the same as in the previous regression. The other is years of schooling in logs
(ln_eduyear), using the DHS variable v133 (education in single years).
WealthID, No_wife, wife_rank: these are used to proxy a woman’s premarital
wealth status.
Urban, region, year, birthyear, age, age2, ethnicity and religion: these vari-
ables are included since a woman’s living area, age, cohort, and ethnic and religious
background may aﬀect both her education/wealth and premarital fertility behavior.
The definition of these variables is the same as in the previous regression.
Age at the first union, Contraception knowledge andHIV prevention knowledge:
are included since they may be correlated to both education/wealth and premarital
fertility. They are defined in the same way as in the previous regression.
Sexage: is a dummy variable of a woman’s age at her first sex. Literature shows
that a woman’s age at her sex onset is associated with her education level, and it also
aﬀects her premarital fertility since earlier sex onset may result in earlier pregnancy.
The corresponding DHS variable is v525 (age at first sexual intercourse).
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